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Abstract 
The Panel Report in Ukraine - Passenger Cars provides an opportunity to revisit an old debate over the 
role of safeguard measures in the WTO. With regard to the legal findings, the panel followed the 
established jurisprudence in this area, and found a number of violations of the Safeguards Agreement. 
With regard to the economics, we delve more deeply into the economic and political background of 
the safeguards investigation. Ukraine was hit by the economic crisis shortly after its WTO accession 
that significantly liberalized import tariffs on passenger cars. Next, we offer a de novo look at the 
injury and causation issues in this case, and discuss the challenges of an industry reliant on offshored 
production that sees a safeguard as a mechanism to attract FDI for production. We conclude with an 
assessment of the operation of the WTO's safeguards regime, along with some tentative suggestions 
for reform. Overall, our examination of the economic analysis by the investigating authority and the 
legal review by the WTO panel raises questions about particular aspects of the domestic and WTO 
processes, but concludes that the system worked well in this case. 
Keywords 
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1. Introduction 
Safeguards is a long-standing mechanism by which GATT Contracting Parties, and now WTO 
Members, can deviate from their normal free trade obligations, and impose tariffs to protect a 
domestic industry. Importantly, and in contrast to the two other so-called "trade remedies," safeguards 
is not a response to "unfair" trade. There are no allegations of unfairness in a safeguards proceeding. 
Rather, the claim is simply that there was an unexpected surge in imports, which caused economic 
harm to the domestic industry, and temporary protection is justified. 
While safeguards appears to go against the trade liberalization goals of the GATT/WTO, the idea is 
that such protections make it possible for governments to liberalize. If they could not offer domestic 
industry these protections, the argument goes, those industries would never agree to liberalization in 
the first place. 
But what if the safeguards protections do not actually work under the constraints imposed by the 
WTO? What if it becomes almost impossible to use the safeguards process? This concern arose after 
the first few WTO disputes over safeguards measures.  
To date, there have been 10 WTO dispute proceedings involving claims under the Safeguards 
Agreement. In all 10 cases, the safeguards measure at issue was found in violation of that Agreement. 
Some early commentary on the Safeguards Agreement suggested that the inability to defend 
safeguards measures at the WTO indicated a problem with the operation of the Agreement. The 
Ukraine - Passenger Cars panel report provides an opportunity to assess the current state of the 
Agreement. Is WTO review of domestic safeguards measures too strict? Or, on the other hand, is it 
simply a necessary check on possible abuses by domestic authorities? 
In this case review, we begin with an examination of the safeguard measure itself and the economic 
background of the safeguard investigation. In this regard, we consider various issues related to 
Ukraine's WTO accession, the global economic crisis and the political economy of the safeguard 
measure, before turning to the Panel's findings on the legality of that measure.  
First, we look at the macroeconomic shocks to the Ukrainian economy prior to the safeguard 
investigation. The safeguard investigation came three years after Ukraine's WTO accession in 2008 
liberalized import tariffs for passenger cars from 25% to 10%. Bown and Wu (2014) suggest that 
safeguard and antidumping measures frequently arise following a new trade agreement as a result of 
market shocks brought by the agreement. At the same time, just months after the accession the country 
was hit by the global economic crisis that sharply reduced credit availability and consumer demand for 
passenger cars. Our analysis continues with a discussion of varying political positions surrounding 
Ukraine's safeguard investigation. Part of the political elite considered the safeguard measures 
necessary to prevent a serious injury to the domestic industry while the other part stressed the negative 
impact on the auto-importing businesses and prices. As a result, the findings of the investigation were 
published one year after the decision was made. Next, we analyze Ukraine's passenger cars market in 
the post-Soviet period and during the period relevant for the safeguard investigation, before turning to 
a brief overview of the Panel's findings. Overall, the Panel found Ukraine's measure was violating a 
number of provisions of the Safeguards Agreement.  
We then offer a de novo review of the measure, by delving into the background of the measure, 
including the assessment of increased imports, injury and causation issues in this case. There we 
discuss some of the implications from the case. First, the procedural failures of the investigation 
demonstrate the challenges that developing countries still face in the application of multilateral trade 
rules. Second, the case raises new questions about the challenges of an industry reliant on offshored 
production. The Ukrainian automobile firms abandoned local brands and were producing cars under 
foreign firms' assembling and manufacturing licenses. We hypothesize that for such an industry the 
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assessment of causal impact of increased imports versus domestic supply shift can be quite different 
from a more traditional domestic industry as the domestic supply is ultimately determined by foreign 
investment and manufacturing contracts. 
We conclude with an assessment of the operation of the WTO's safeguards regime, along with 
some tentative suggestions for reform, to the extent that people continue to believe that reform is 
needed. 
2. Economic background and safeguard investigation 
2.1 WTO accession, crisis and political economy of Ukraine's safeguard investigation 
In 2008 and 2009, the Ukrainian car market was hit by two important events. First, in May 2008, 
Ukraine joined the WTO. As a result of the WTO accession, car import tariffs dropped from 25% to 
10% and the prohibition on importing used cars older than eight years was lifted (Ernst and Young, 
2016). Second, the financial crisis and credit crunch hit Ukraine in 2009, when only about 5% of cars 
were purchased with credit compared with about 50% in 2008 (AUTO-Consulting 2009b, Focus 2008). 
Demand for new cars dropped by 74% from 2008 to 2009, due to falling incomes, lack of credit 
opportunities and economic uncertainty. The Ukrainian economy was greatly affected by the crisis, 
and the currency depreciated substantially. Sharp economic contraction was evident already by early 
in 2009. In response, the Parliament passed a law, overriding a presidential veto that increased the 
import tariffs of all goods except for “critical imports” by 13% in March 2009. The measure was 
removed in May 2009 for most goods, and in September for refrigerators and motor cars (WTO 2016, 
CMS 2009).  
In its request for a safeguard investigation in 2011, the industry association UkrAutoprom, 
representing domestic producers ZAZ, KrASZ and Eurocar (Bogdan joined later), mentioned that the 
share of imported cars in total sales during the 2008-2010 period had increased by 16%. The capacity 
utilisation of Ukrainian factories was at 20% and the number of employees decreased by 70%. 
Representatives of the industry association claimed that the safeguard measures would give incentives 
for FDI that would lead to the opening of new factories. UkrAvtoprom had previously obtained 
protection against automobile imports from Russia between 2001 and 2006, first through a 31.7% duty 
and then through quotas. As a result of the measures, VAZ started car manufacturing in Ukraine. Petr 
Poroshenko, then the Minister of Economy, announced in early June 2012 that the safeguard 
investigation had come to a conclusion and that Ukraine had good reasons to protect the market. The 
results of the investigation, however, were not made public. The minister justified the need for 
protection, comparing Russian import tariffs of 20-25% with Ukrainian tariffs at 10% and mentioning 
subsidies received by European automobile producers. He also said the protection is needed due to 
12,000 jobs lost because of the decline in Ukrainian car production in 2009 (AUTO-Consulting 2012c, 
Zerkalo Nedeli 2012).  
The investigative authority (Interdepartmental Committee for International Trade) found that the 
share of imported products in the total amount of products sold domestically increased by 37.9% in 
2010 relative to 2008, although in absolute terms imported products fell by 71%. The domestic 
production in Ukraine fell by 76.9% in the same period, the largest drop in the world, and domestic 
sales fell by 86.3%. The Committee pointed to the increase in the import share of cars originating from 
Turkey, South Korea, Romania and Germany in 2010 relative to 2008. According to the Committee, 
the number of workers in domestic car manufacturing fell by 51.6% and operational profits fell by 
89.9%. The Committee concluded that increased imports had led to the displacement of the domestic 
producers from the home market and threatened serious injury to the industry.  
The introduction of the safeguard measure was met with resistance within Ukraine. Although the 
investigative committee came to its conclusions by the 28 May 2012, the decision was not circulated 
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until 14 March 2013. Lobbying from the industry association on one side, and the importers 
association, on the other side, could be behind the delay. The association of car importers and dealers 
was vocal about the potential negative impacts of the measure. Furthermore, Viktor Janukovich Jr, a 
Ukrainian MP and vice-president of the national automobile club, strongly criticized imposing the 
measures, suggesting it would not help the industry, would dampen the budget due to lower import 
supply, and could lead to retaliation through the WTO (AUTO-Consulting, 2012d). The role of these 
political economy factors was exacerbated by the reports that Poroshenko's business reach involved 
ownership of the car production company Bogdan and Lutsk car factory (AUTO-Consulting 2012a, 
Golovnev 2014).  
Table 1 presents a timeline of the events from the initiation of the investigation in 2011 until the 
revocation of the safeguard measure in September 2015. 
Table 1. Timeline of events related to the safeguard measure 
Date Event 
30 June 2011 Initiation of safeguard investigation 
28 April 2012 Safeguard investigation is concluded 
14 March 2013 Findings of the safeguard investigation are published 
14 April 2013 Safeguard measure comes into force 
30 October 2013 Japan files a request for consultations at the WTO 
14 April 2014 Ukraine reduces the safeguard duty levels 
26 March 2014 A Panel is established at the WTO 
26 June 2015 Panel Report is published 
30 September 2015 Safeguard measure is revoked 
2.2 Automobile production in post-Soviet Ukraine 
At the end of the 1980s, four companies produced cars and trucks in the Ukraine. The most important 
car manufacturer was ZAZ (which was one of the domestic firms that requested the safeguard 
investigation), known for its relatively cheap, small-sized model Zaporozhets that had been very 
popular in the USSR. During Soviet times, the market was exclusively supplied by cars produced in 
the USSR, in particular Russian SFSR and Ukrainian SSR. In 1994 ZAZ was privatized, although the 
state continued to hold 86 percent of the company. ZAZ launched a new model Tavria in 1995, but 
sales fell continuously over time. The production of ZAZ declined from 156,000 cars in 1991 to 
negligible levels by 1997. The low quality of the Tavria model and a relatively high price were key to 
the falling demand.  
ZAZ initiated a joint venture with Daewoo in 1998 to help it stay afloat. As part of the deal, the 
Ukrainian government increased import tariffs on cars from 30 to 60 percent. Also, Daewoo was 
granted special privileges, such as importing parts duty-free. After the first year, the joint venture was 
already performing below the expectations of both parties. Only minimal assembly was done in 
Ukraine, as practically assembled cars were coming from South Korea. For its part, Daewoo was 
unhappy with the high number of imports of used cars, which undercut its sales. Used cars constituted 
a large majority of all car sales, and importers of used cars found various loopholes to avoid paying 
the hefty import duties. The problems of the joint venture with Daewoo are similar to challenges of the 
Ukrainian automobile industry in 2009. Among the main reasons for the failure of the joint venture 
were the economic crisis of 1998-1999 that affected internal market demand, the low productivity of 
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the production in Ukraine, and competition with other countries hosting Daewoo production facilities 
(Romania, Poland, Uzbekistan).  
By contrast, an assembly partnership of Ukrainian car factories with the Russian company 
AvtoVAZ was long-lasting. Before 1999 AvtoVAZ only exported assembled cars, but after 1999 
AvtoVAZ started supplying parts and components to Ukrainian factories to assemble cars. When 
Ukraine imposed a preliminary anti-dumping duty of 31.7% on car imports from Russia in August 
2002, the measure had an instantaneous effect. Within four months of the measure coming into force, 
the market share of AvtoVAZ fell from 54% to 37% (Ukrayinska Pravda, 2003). Shortly afterwards 
the duty was revoked while an import quota was introduced. These measures led to a further 
expansion of the AvtoVAZ's Lada car assembly in Ukraine. Success of these trade restrictive measures 
targeted at encouraging Russian car producers to assemble in Ukraine was a relevant motivator for 
imposing the safeguard measures in 2013. 
2.3 Ukraine's passenger cars market 
The economic downturn that the post-Soviet countries were experiencing up until the 2000s eventually 
gave way to more rapid growth. From 2000 to 2008 Ukraine's GDP increased by 71% (World Bank, 
2015). In addition, the low car density of 106.76 cars per 1000 people in 2000 increased to 138.22 per 
1000 people in 2008 (HumanProgress.org, 2014). Soaring incomes, demand and credit availability had 
a positive impact on car sales, which grew at about 30% annually. By 2008 Ukraine was an important 
market for passenger cars as the seventh largest market in Europe by the number of cars sold and by 
growth potential (AUTO-Consulting, 2009a).  
Figure 1 shows the quantity of car sales, domestic production, imports and exports from 2006 to 
2013 relative to the amount in 2008. The passenger cars market in Ukraine was rapidly growing and 
all factors were improving between 2005 and 2008. However, the market crashed in 2009 as the 
country was hit by the global economic crisis that sharply reduced credit availability and consumer 
demand for passenger cars. Sales of both locally produced and imported cars plummeted: only about 
162,000 cars were sold in 2009 compared to 623,000 in 2008. In the period from 2008 to 2009, 
imports and domestic production fell at an almost equal rate. However total imports showed a 
recovery from 2009 to 2010 while the domestic production stagnated which is probably related to the 
liberalization of import duties on passenger cars.  
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Figure 1. Passenger cars market in Ukraine (index, 2008=1) 
 
Source: UN COMTRADE, International Organization of Motor Vehicle Manufacturers 
Figure 2 shows Ukraine’s import values of passenger cars for the five largest exporters and the rest of 
the world. The main passenger cars exporters to Ukraine in the 2008-2010 period that was analyzed in 
the safeguard investigation were Japan, Russia, China, Germany and South Korea. Japan was the 
largest exporter during the period and more than doubled exports to Ukraine from 2007 to 2008. The 
sharp and sudden increase was possibly driven by optimistic predictions about the market 
development.  
Japan's role as the largest exporter with quickly rising importance in Ukrainian market could 
explain why Japan initiated the litigation, although the safeguard measure affected all exporters. 
Indeed, as Bown and McCulloch (2003) discuss, safeguard measures have a disproportionate negative 
effect on the largest and fastest growing exporters. The Japanese delegation at the WTO mentioned, in 
its arguments against the safeguard measure, that Ukraine's passenger car imports in 2010 were 
actually 71.5% lower the 2009 levels. Japan was claiming that its car exports to Ukraine dropped even 
more: from 51,600 cars in 2008 to 9,000 cars in 2010, that is, by 82.5%. Overall, trends in Figure 2 
support the Japanese position that the imports were sharply falling within the analyzed period.  
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Figure 2. Import value of passenger cars of Ukraine by exporters, US dollars 
 
Source: Prepared by authors using data from UN COMTRADE, Harmonised System codes 
870322 and 870323. 
3. Analysis of the Panel's Findings1 
There are two stages for safeguard measures. First, through a domestic legal process, a government 
agency must decide whether to impose a measure. Second, after a measure has been imposed, WTO 
Members may challenge that measure in WTO dispute settlement. In this section, we consider the 
second stage in relation to the measure at issue here. 
The analysis of any WTO dispute must begin with the specific government measure(s) at issue. 
Here, the measure was the definitive safeguard duty imposed by Ukraine on imports of certain 
passenger cars, and the investigation that led to the imposition of this measure.  
The safeguard measure took the form of special tariff duties imposed at different rates, 
differentiated by engine volumes, as follows: 6.46% for passenger cars with an engine volume of 
1000cm3 – 1500cm3 (UKTZED2 code 8703 22 1000) and 12.95% for passenger cars with an engine 
volume of 1500cm3 – 2200 cm3 (UKTZED code 8703 23 1910)). The safeguard measure was to be 
progressively liberalized in accordance with a schedule based on 12 and 24 months from the day of 
initial application of the measure, with duties reduced to 4.31% and 2.15% for the first engine 
category and 8.63% and 4.32% for the second category. (Paras. 2.1-13, 7.2-14) 
                                                     
1
  This section is drawn from the Panel Report, Ukraine - Definitive Safeguard Measures on Certain Passenger Cars, 
WT/DS468/R, adopted 20 July 2015. 
2
 Ukrainian Foreign Economic Activity Commodity Classification Code ("Customs Code of Ukraine"). 
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In terms of the legal claims, for the most part, this dispute dealt with issues similar to those raised 
in other safeguards disputes. In this section, we provide a brief overview of the most important Panel 
findings. 
To begin, an overarching issue that arises in trade remedy challenges at the WTO is the standard of 
review. In such cases, the WTO dispute settlement system is reviewing a domestic judicial decision, 
acting, in a sense, as a court of appeal. Thus, a WTO panel is not conducting a de novo review of the 
issue, that is, it is not making a finding of its own as to whether, for example, increased imports have 
caused serious injury. Rather, it is applying a standard of review that allows it to scrutinize the 
domestic authority's reasoning on the issue of whether increased imports have caused serious injury. 
Here, the Panel explained that its "examination of the competent authorities' determinations [would] 
be based on the report published by the competent authorities." In this regard, "the explanations 
contained in the report must be 'explicit,' 'clear and unambiguous,' and must not 'merely imply or 
suggest an explanation.'" In the event that there is no "reasoned and adequate explanation" for the 
determination set out in the published report, the Panel has "no option but to find that the competent 
authority has not performed the analysis correctly." (Paras. 7.22-28) 
We now turn to a summary of the legal claims of the Panel Report. 
3.1 Unforeseen developments 
Turning to the legal claims, in two early decisions - see Argentina – Footwear (WTO, 2000a: paras. 
76-98); Korea-Dairy (WTO, 2000b: paras. 68-92) - the Appellate Body found that the language in 
GATT Article XIX:1(a) on "unforeseen developments" and "the effect of GATT obligations" 
continued to apply after the Safeguards Agreement was in effect. Applying these provisions in this 
case, the Panel found that Ukraine failed to make a proper determination of unforeseen developments, 
because "the competent authorities in their published report identified the relative increase in imports 
as the unforeseen development rather than identifying and explaining any unforeseen developments 
that resulted in that relative increase in imports." It also found that Ukraine failed to make a proper 
determination of the effect of GATT 1994 obligations, because it did not identify in its published 
report the effect of GATT 1994 obligations. (Paras. 7.60-104) 
The Panel then addressed the three core elements of a safeguards determination: increased imports, 
serious injury (here, the threat of serious injury), and causation. 
3.2 Increased imports 
With regard to the issue of increased imports, the Panel found a violation of Article 2.1 of the 
Safeguards Agreement on three bases. First, the Panel concluded that Ukraine acted inconsistently 
with Article 2.1 by failing to provide an explanation in its published report regarding how intervening 
trends in imports relative to domestic production supported the competent authorities' determination 
that there was a relative increase for the period of investigation (2008-2010). In addition, the Panel 
concluded that Ukraine acted inconsistently with Article 2.1 by failing to demonstrate in its published 
report, through reasoned explanations, that there was an increase in imports during the period of 
investigation that was sudden enough, sharp enough, and significant enough. And finally, Ukraine 
acted inconsistently with Article 2.1 -- specifically the requirement that a product "is being imported" 
in increased quantities -- by applying a safeguard measure that was not based on a "recent" increase in 
imports. (Paras. 7.116-185) 
To illustrate this issue more clearly, in terms of the flaws in the investigating authorities' analysis 
identified by the Panel, it is worth going into more depth on one of these findings. The Panel had 
found it "clear that, for an affirmative determination of increased imports to be consistent with Article 
2.1, it is not sufficient for the competent authorities to establish an increase in imports through a 
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simple mathematical comparison of data for the two end points marking the beginning and end of the 
period of investigation." It continued, "[i]t is necessary, though still not sufficient by itself, that the 
competent authorities also set out in their published report a reasoned and adequate explanation 
concerning the development of imports between the end points, i.e. concerning the intervening trends 
in imports that occurred during the period of investigation." Here, the Panel observed that "the 
published report of the competent authorities contains only an end-point-to-end-point comparison and 
analysis, finding that the import volume relative to domestic production was 37.9% higher in 2010 
than in 2008." The published report "provides neither data nor an explanation concerning intervening 
trends in relative imports, and specifically, makes no reference to import volume relative to domestic 
production in 2009." While Ukraine provided relevant data and analysis of intervening trends in 
imports in relative terms in its first written submission to the Panel, the Panel stated that "such an ex 
post explanation cannot remedy the deficiency in the competent authorities' determination as set out in 
the Notice." Nevertheless, finding it "instructive to consider briefly" the data provided by Ukraine, the 
Panel considered that "[a] brief look at intervening trends … reveals that the competent authorities' 
end-point-to-end-point analysis is not sufficient on its own to explain adequately why and how the 
facts of this case supported the conclusion of the competent authorities." In response to Ukraine's 
argument that a more detailed analysis regarding increased imports was performed, but that analysis is 
confidential, the Panel stated that "Ukraine did not explain how or why an analysis of intervening 
trends (as opposed to the actual import volumes) could be confidential." (Paras. 7.129-138) 
3.3 Serious injury to the domestic industry 
The second major issue in a safeguards determination is to assess whether serious injury to the 
domestic industry exists. Here, the allegation was of a "threat" of serious injury under Article 4.2(a). 
In this regard, the Panel found as follows. First, it concluded that the competent authorities failed to 
properly evaluate, and give a reasoned explanation of, the likely development of the import market 
share and its likely effect on the situation of the domestic industry in the very near future; second, the 
competent authorities "failed to properly evaluate and give a reasoned explanation of, the likely 
development of imports, either in absolute terms or relative to domestic production, and their likely 
effect on the situation of the domestic industry in the very near future"; third, the competent authorities 
"failed to properly evaluate, and give a reasoned explanation of, the increase in the very near future in 
exports to Ukraine's market, anticipated to arise from current or imminent capacity of exporting 
countries to export"; and finally, the competent authorities "failed to properly evaluate, and give a 
reasoned explanation of, the likely developments in the injury factors relating directly to the situation 
of the domestic industry and the likely effect of these developments on the situation of the domestic 
industry in the very near future." (Paras. 7.222-270) On this basis, the Panel concluded that Ukraine 
acted inconsistently with Safeguards Agreement Article 4.2(a).  
3.4 Causal impact of increased imports on injury 
Finally, the Panel turned to the issue of causation, that is, whether the increased imports were causing 
the serious injury. On this issue, the Panel recalled Appellate Body precedent that under Article 4.2(b), 
competent authorities are required "to establish … a 'genuine and substantial relationship of cause and 
effect,'" and also that "the relationship between the movements in imports and the movements in injury 
factors is central to a causation analysis and determination." Furthermore, the Panel agreed with the 
panel in U.S. - Steel Safeguards that "upward movements in imports should normally occur at the 
same time as downward movements in injury factors in order for coincidence to be indicative of a 
causal link." The Panel then examined the facts here, and noted evidence showing that between 2008 
and 2009 imports decreased in absolute and relative terms and injury factors showed a deterioration, 
while between 2009 and 2010 imports increased in relative terms as compared to 2008, but some 
injury factors actually improved, as compared to 2008. While the Panel did not conclude from these 
trends that no coincidence in movements exists in this case, nonetheless, because the injury factors 
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worsened when there was a relative decrease in imports and began to improve when there was a 
relative increase, Ukraine's investigating authorities "should have addressed these movements, which 
seem counter to findings of coincidence and causation, and given reasoned and adequate explanations 
as to why a causal link nevertheless existed." The Panel concluded that "the competent authorities did 
not undertake a proper analysis of the relationship between movements in imports and movement in 
injury factors." On this basis, the Panel found that the competent authorities did not demonstrate, 
through reasoned and adequate explanations, how the developments identified support their 
determination that a relative increase in imports contributed to bringing about a threat of serious injury. 
It thus concluded that Ukraine acted inconsistently with Article 4.2(b). (Paras. 7.289-307) 
The Panel also found a separate violation of the causation requirement on the basis that "the 
competent authorities should have identified and explained in the published report, in clear and 
unambiguous terms, the nature and extent of the injurious effects of those other factors as 
distinguished from injurious effects of increased imports, as well as the particular method used to 
separate and distinguish other causal factors." (Paras. 7.308-334) 
3.5 Other Findings of Violation 
Beyond these core Safeguards Agreement obligations, the Panel also concluded that, "to the extent 
that Ukraine failed to provide adequate opportunity for prior consultations to review a proposed 
timetable for progressive liberalization, Ukraine cannot be said to have 'endeavoured to maintain' a 
substantially equivalent level of concessions and other obligations, because without a proposed 
timetable for progressive liberalization, exporting Members such as Japan were unable to form an 
accurate understanding as to what might constitute a substantially equivalent level of concessions or 
other obligations." Thus, the Panel concluded that Ukraine acted inconsistently with Safeguards 
Agreement Article 8.1 because it "failed to endeavour to maintain a substantially equivalent level of 
concessions and other obligations." (Paras. 7.544-553) 
Finally, the Panel also found violations related to Ukraine's failure to provide proper notice during 
the proceedings, to publish the report promptly, and to notify the WTO's Safeguards Committee. 
4. Assessment of increased imports, injury and causation 
WTO panels are not supposed to do a de novo reassessment of a safeguard measure. We, on the other 
hand, are under no such constraints. In this section, we examine some of the economic data relevant to 
the issues of whether the Ukrainian industry was suffering the economic harm required in order for a 
safeguard measure to be imposed. First, we will look at the evidence of increased imports followed by 
analyzing injury to the industry and causal effect of various factors. 
It follows from the previous section that the Ukrainian authorities’ published report was very brief 
and scarce on argumentation and providing evidence despite the long investigation process. Arguably, 
this shows the difficulties of the policymakers in developing countries to follow the investigation 
procedures required by the WTO. Thus our analysis of the market does not represent Ukraine’s 
published report arguments but what could have been present in the report.  
4.1 Increased imports and injury to the domestic industry 
4.1.1 Evidence of increased imports 
The Panel found that Ukraine acted inconsistently with the Article 2.1 of the Safeguards Agreement by 
failing to demonstrate clearly that there was a sharp, significant and sudden increase in relative 
imports during the analyzed period (2008-2010). The WTO panel criticized the investigation by the 
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Ukrainian authorities for providing only information about the change in relative importance of 
imports between 2010 and 2008 but not showing trends and outcomes in 2009. 
As we saw in Figure 1 and Figure 2, both the total imports and imports from the largest exporters 
fell in absolute terms from 2008 to 2009 and increased from 2009 to 2010. Thus the relevant question 
is whether there was a consistent increase in relative imports throughout the analyzed period. We will 
now present the trend of relative imports in Ukraine’s passenger cars market to understand whether 
Ukraine could have potentially met the requirements. Available data presents two different pictures for 
2009 depending on the definition of relative importance of imports. In this study we applied two 
different methods of calculating the import penetration given the available data. Figure 3 provides the 
import penetration between 2005 and 2014 calculated with the two methods. 
First, we can define the import penetration for a given period (year) as the share of foreign cars 
imported in that period in total car sales. The resulting trend from this definition is marked by a light 
gray line in Figure 3. However, this definition has a problem that is apparent in the case of the 
Ukrainian passenger cars market. Import penetration, according to the first measure, sharply drops 
from 2008 to 2009 and then increases again from 2009 to 2010. The sharp increases and drops are 
connected with the difference in the time point when products are imported and the point when the 
products are actually sold on the market. Thus the drop from 2008 to 2009 can simply be a result of 
over-importing in 2008 due to optimistic predictions before the crisis hit that led to cars that were 
imported in 2008 being sold in 2009. Hence, few additional imports were required in 2009. 
Figure 3. Import penetration in passenger cars market in Ukraine (HS 8703) 
 
Source: Prepared by authors using data from UN COMTRADE, International Organization of 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers 
Indeed, the jumps in 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 disappear if we look at the share of imported cars in 
total sales in a given year, whether the cars were imported in the same year or not. That is, we measure 
import penetration as 1 minus the market share of domestically produced cars. Imports are expected to 
be ordered longer in advance than the domestic production due to the transportation and clearance 
time, which can be quite long. Thus the domestic production might respond quicker to the changes in 
the market demand due the large shocks. Here we see that share of foreign cars sold on the market 
increased from 2008 to 2009 and from 2009 to 2010. The relative importance of imports increased 
from about 40% to 72% in 2009 and to 75% from 2009 to 2010. 
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4.1.2 Evidence of threat of serious injury to the domestic industry 
With regard to injury, the WTO panel ruled that the Ukrainian competent authorities did not 
demonstrate clearly that the domestic industry was under a threat of a serious injury over the analyzed 
period. Specifically, Ukraine did not explain what the likely development of imports would be in the 
near future. Below we first address the evidence of injury factors to the domestic industry and then 
briefly discuss how Ukraine could have explained the likely development of export capacity of 
exporting countries. 
First, let us look at the situation of domestic industry by 2011 and possible developments. 
Ukrainian car industry did not produce local brands since 2011 as the only remaining Ukrainian car, 
Tavria, was taken off production. But already before that the Ukrainian car manufacturing companies 
focused on assembling or providing complete manufacturing under the licenses of foreign car 
companies. The worries of the domestic manufacturers were motivated by the withdrawal of 
companies that were assembling in Ukraine between 2008 and 2010. In the boom years until 2008, 
ZAZ factories were manufacturing Opel Astra and Mercedes, while Eurocar was producing Sat, Audi 
and Volkswagen cars. However, in the period from 2008 to 2010, automobile brands were 
withdrawing production from Ukraine. First Volkswagen terminated car manufacturing in Ukraine in 
the fall of 2008. Assembly by Opel and Audi stopped in 2009. As discussed in the Section 2, the 
Ukrainian manufacturers were requesting trade protection as a means to create an environment 
attractive for FDI. 
Table 2 shows the only brands that continued production in Ukraine by 2011. Almost all cars 
produced locally (under foreign license) were under the two HS codes covered by the safeguard. Thus 
Ukraine could have argued that the withdrawal of a number of brands producing in Ukraine meant that 
it was unlikely that the industry would recover in the near future. The safeguard measure then could 
provide a necessary environment for a profitable production of the remaining brands after the shock of 
the global crisis and sharp import tariff liberalization. 
Table 2. Car production in Ukraine by car HS code, 2011-2012 
Domestic Firms Domestically produced car models 
 HS8703221000 HS8703231910 Neither 
Zaz Chery and Chevrolet 
(Lanos, Forza, Vida) 
 
 
 
Eurocar Skoda Skoda  
KrasZ Geely  Ssang Yong 
Bogdan  Lada-Bogdan, 
Hyundai Tucson 
 
 
Source: Inputs collected from http://ukrmach.dp.ua/2012/05/29/ukraina-komu-vygodny-
specposhliny-na-inomarki.html 
Next, to assess how significant was the threat of a serious injury to the domestic industry, we compare 
Ukraine’s passenger cars production with that of other countries.  
One relevant comparison group is other Eastern European countries likely to have a similar 
economic environment. Figure 4 compares the passenger cars production from 2006 to 2012 relative 
to the production quantity in 2008 for five Eastern European EU member states (Romania, Hungary, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Poland) and three non-members (Ukraine, Russia and Serbia) for which have 
production data in the analyzed period.  
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Figure 4. Production quantity of passenger cars of certain countries (index, 2008=1) 
  
Source: Prepared by authors using data from International Organization of Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers 
The development of Ukrainian car production before 2008 follows a very similar trend to each of the 
other countries. However, Ukraine had the largest production drop from 2008 to 2009 and smallest 
recovery from 2009 to 2010. Given that all the countries in the group are in a competition with 
Ukraine for attracting car manufacturers, Ukraine could have argued that the developments from 2008 
to 2010 made its industry recovery unlikely while some closely located countries were increasing their 
production over the same period.  
The second relevant group for assessing the injury includes countries that saw the largest decreases 
in the passenger cars production during the analyzed period. Figure 5 presents the production trends 
for five countries with the worst fall in production (Ukraine is among them) and total for all countries 
in the world. In fact, South Korea and Japan are also among the largest exporters to Ukraine. All 
countries saw a similarly drastic fall in production between 2008 and 2010. The production in Ukraine 
and Thailand fell very suddenly already from 2008 to 2009 while the production of Finland, South 
Korea and Japan a bit more modestly from 2008 to 2009 with a continued fall from 2009 to 2010. At 
the same time South Korea and Japan showed similarly sharp recovery by 2011. In conclusion, 
Ukraine had one of the worst declines in production worldwide and its slow recovery was matched 
only by Finland. Furthermore, two large exporters to Ukraine were also in the group of those exporters 
most hit after 2008 and yet they managed a much stronger recovery after 2010. Because world car 
production was recovering after 2010, it could also be argued that these countries also experienced an 
increase in their export capacity.  
  
0.1
0.3
0.5
0.7
0.9
1.1
1.3
1.5
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Year 
Ukraine Hungary Poland Romania
Serbia Slovakia Slovenia Russia
Does Safeguards Need Saving? Lessons from the Ukraine - Passenger Cars Dispute 
13 
Figure 5. Production quantity of passenger cars of certain countries (index, 2008=1) 
  
Source: Prepared by authors using data from International Organization of Motor Vehicle 
Manufacturers 
4.2 Causal impact of various factors 
The WTO panel ruled that the Ukrainian competent authorities failed to demonstrate that imports 
caused injury to the domestic industry. In this section we attempt to shed light on the relative 
importance of various factors in causing injury to the domestic industry.  
Here we follow Irwin (2003) by decomposing the change in the domestic car production into that 
arising due to a shift in market demand, foreign supply, and domestic supply so as to assess whether 
imports caused injury to the domestic industry. Irwin (2003) describes the differences in the attribution 
analysis between the US ITC and the WTO Safeguards Agreement and advocates a simple method 
from Kelly (1988) that provides a decomposition of the injury into various factors. If the 
decomposition of domestic supply change reveals that the import supply shift is the largest component, 
then the attribution requirement of the Safeguards Agreement is deemed to be satisfied. In line with 
this reasoning, we follow the method developed in Kelly (1988) to assess the role of imports in 
causing injury to the Ukrainian automobile industry.  
Kelly (1988) develops a model with linear demand and supply functions. In its framework, soaring 
imports make a clear prediction on price and market demand. A shift in import supply should increase 
the total consumption demand and thus lead to a price drop. In such situations the safeguard measure 
can protect the domestic market against import supply shocks. If instead the demand shock is the main 
cause of the injury, then the price should move in the same direction as the consumption demand. 
Falling price and consumption demand would indicate of the role of demand shock in causing the 
injury. Finally, a negative shift in the domestic supply curve would lead to an increase in price and 
imports. 
We apply the version of the model where domestic and imported goods are perfect substitutes for 
two reasons. First, most of the domestically produced cars were in fact foreign brands that would be 
sold at almost the same price as the imported cars. Second, the perfect substitutes model overstates the 
impact of imports on domestic injury if the domestic and foreign goods are imperfect substitutes. As 
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we will see below, increased imports are not the main injury factor even in the perfect substitutes 
model so they wouldn’t be the main factor in the imperfect substitutes model either. 
The change in domestic supply is decomposed as follows: 
 
𝛥𝑆 =
1
𝜈
[ 𝑤𝐷𝑒𝐷𝐷 (𝜂
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] 
where 𝜈 = 𝜂 − 𝑤𝐷𝑒𝐷 −𝑤𝑀𝑒𝑀, 𝑤𝐷 =
𝑆
𝐷
, 𝑤𝑀 =
𝑀
𝐷
, 𝑒𝐷 is the elasticity of domestic supply, 𝑒𝑀 is the 
elasticity of export supply, 𝜂 is the elasticity of domestic demand, 𝛥 denotes the observed change of a 
variable. 
First, note that the third term, change in imports, has to be the largest in absolute value negative 
component so that the import shift would be the main cause of injury. However in our case that term is 
positive independent of the assumptions about elasticity because the price increased over the analysed 
period when imports fell. Indeed, 
1
𝜈
(−𝑤𝐷𝑒𝐷𝑀(𝑒𝑀
𝛥𝑃
𝑃
−
𝛥𝑀
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)) > 0  as  𝜈 < 0,−𝑤𝐷𝑒𝐷 < 0,  𝑒𝑀 >
0,
𝛥𝑃
𝑃
> 0,−
𝛥𝑀
𝑀
> 0. 
Table 3 below presents the required information on consumption demand, domestic production, 
imports and prices for Ukrainian passenger cars sector. Over the period 2008-2010, the price 
moderately increased, the consumption demand plummeted and imports dropped. Due to data 
availability, the analysis is conducted for a 4-digit code 8703 that covers also passenger cars that were 
not under safeguard investigation. However, the investigated products are about 80% of the passenger 
cars market (Zerkalo Nedeli, 2012) and almost 100% of the domestically produced cars.  
Table 3. Passenger cars market in Ukraine, 2008-2011 
 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Consumption, units 623,000 162,300 162,600 220,000 
Domestic production 327,000 97,000 54,000 68,000 
Import 296,000 66,000 108,000 152,000 
Export 73,000 18,000 33,000 42,000 
Import market share, per cent 0.48 0.41 0.66 0.69 
Average unit price, EUR 13,965 14,295 16,605 16,364 
Source. Autoconsulting, available at 
http://gazeta.zn.ua/ECONOMICS/programma_nadezhd_dlya_avtoproma.html 
As discussed above, if the increased imports are the major cause of injury to the domestic industry, 
then the overall consumption should increase and price drops. The opposite happened in Ukraine: the 
imports dropped while price increased.  
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In order to make an assessment of the contribution of each injury factor, we need elasticity 
estimates. First, elasticity of export supply for Ukraine is estimated between 6 and 7 for HS codes 
870322 and 870323 (Nicita et al., 2013). Table 4 present the outcome for a case where both domestic 
and foreign export supply elasticity equals 6 while domestic demand elasticity equals -1 as an example. 
Calculations reveal a negative shift in the domestic supply curve as the main cause of the injury to the 
domestic industry. Import supply does not appear to have caused any injury to the domestic industry. 
Although the weight of each factor varies with the elasticity estimates, the importance and signs of the 
effects are very robust for a variety of elasticity estimates applied. In particular, domestic supply shift 
is robustly the strongest injury factor and demand shift is the second injury factor. Finally, import shift 
is not a cause for injury, but rather a positive factor for domestic supply. Hence the WTO Panel's 
decision is line with the economic assessment of the injury attribution. 
Table 4. Attribution of injury 
Percentage change in 
domestic production 
 Due to demand 
shift 
Due to domestic 
supply shift 
Due to import 
shift 
-83.5% -50% -99% +65% 
4.3 Alternative assessment of causality: case of downstream industry 
The passenger cars industry in Ukraine was focused on manufacturing and assembling cars for foreign 
brands under license agreements. The domestic industry needed contracts and orders from foreign 
brands in order to manufacture. This situation is rather different from a traditional domestic industry 
that can decide about its supply. Thus the industry saw imports as a barrier to receiving foreign 
investments and stated that the safeguard measure should help to attract the foreign companies to 
manufacture in Ukraine. A number of these brands manufacturing in Ukraine closed local production 
in or after 2009 opting for exporting into Ukraine the final product. Negative shock of the crisis 
combined with the more liberal import tariff could have triggered such decisions. 
As more and more developing countries rely on offshoring the policymakers will face a challenge 
of shielding the domestic industries when foreign firms re-shore or move to another location. Ukraine-
Passenger Cars is an interesting case as it demonstrates the challenges faced by an FDI-reliant industry 
when several brands simultaneously stop operations leaving factories empty.  
Supply decomposition above revealed the domestic supply shift as the main cause of falling 
domestic production. But what are the factors shifting the Ukrainian car supply? The local companies 
were operating only thanks to the foreign investment for car assembly. This type of FDI is a direct 
substitute for car imports. The domestic firms compete with imports not only for car sales but also for 
ability to operate and assemble cars. So if the falling import tariffs due to WTO accession make 
exporting final goods more attractive relative to manufacturing in Ukraine, then it could be argued that 
the trade concessions have caused injury to the domestic market, and left the capacity underutilized 
and workers unemployed in a sudden manner.  
Ukrainian domestic producers did not sustain injury due to the increased imports. But they could 
have sustained injury due to the trade concessions that made the FDI into domestic manufacturing 
unattractive. This distinction is very important as discussed by Sykes (2003). Sykes presents a 
comprehensive analysis of the GATT/WTO law regarding safeguard measures from an economic 
perspective. It discusses the inconsistencies of the formulation of the relevant rules in defining 
exogenous and endogenous factors. The paper argues that originally concession was the exogenous 
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factor that could through increased imports cause injury to the industry (endogenous factors). However, 
later the understanding shifted to imports seen as exogenous factor that could cause injury, and the 
relationship to the concessions went away.  
The original reference to trade concessions was made with regards to the GATT tariff cuts. 
However, the spirit of the original GATT concessions is comparable to the liberalisation that the 
newly acceding WTO members undergo. From that perspective, the safeguard measures could be 
justified by demonstrating that trade concessions had a causal effect on market equilibrium that injured 
injuring the domestic producers. And in this reasoning the imports are not the problem per se but as an 
alternative to FDI. And as our brief analysis revealed, the domestic supply was the leading cause of 
injury. Therefore, one could argue that trade concessions related to the WTO accession had an 
unforeseen effect and caused injury to the domestic industry through the domestic supply rather than 
imports.  
5. Reassessing WTO Safeguards Law 
The Ukraine – Passenger Cars dispute offers a useful case study of the complexities of the economic 
analysis carried out by government agencies who administer domestic safeguards law, as well as the 
international legal review conducted by the WTO dispute settlement system. Beyond the specifics of 
this case, though, it also illustrates more generally some flaws in the safeguards system (and perhaps 
with trade remedies more broadly). 
A frequent criticism of the WTO's review of safeguards is that these measures are always found in 
violation of WTO obligations. Thus, it is suggested, in practice the system does not allow safeguard 
measures and therefore does not function properly
3
. 
This argument is technically true, if you focus only on claims against safeguards measures that 
have been brought to conclusion under the Safeguards Agreement. However, it misses some important 
context. While all WTO challenges under the Safeguards Agreement that have resulted in a ruling 
have led to a finding of violation, the vast majority of safeguards measures are never challenged. 
According to the WTO, from 1 January 1995 to 30 April 2015, there have been 147 safeguard 
measures imposed (WTO, 2015). In that same period, however, only 26 measures involving measures 
under the Safeguards Agreement were even challenged at the WTO (WorldTradeLaw.net, 2016),
4
 and 
only ten of these led to a dispute settlement ruling under the Safeguards Agreement. The practical 
reality, then, is that most safeguards measures are imposed without much of a fight from affected 
trading partners. 
Nevertheless, it is true that when WTO panels and the Appellate Body review safeguard measures, 
they always find flaws. But is there anything wrong with that? 
On the one hand, it could be argued that WTO panels and the Appellate Body are doing exactly 
what they are supposed to. Maybe the nit-picking they are doing is necessary as a constraint on 
investigating authorities. Without a serious check on their behavior, there would be a risk of biased 
findings by partial domestic government agencies. Thus, in this view, stringent oversight serves to 
keep the agencies in line. 
As noted, there have been only 10 measures found to violate the Safeguard Agreement. That is 
quite a small number in comparison to the total number of measures. And while all have found 
violations, keep in mind that over 90 percent of all WTO claims lead to findings of violation 
                                                     
3
  Bown (2002) discusses a related question of relative unpopularity of safeguard measures.  
4
 It takes time for a WTO complaint to get started after a measure has been imposed, so it is not clear which time period 
should be used to gather precise data on the total number of safeguard measures that could be challenged. The period up 
to 30 April 2015 is just a rough approximation. 
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(WorldTradeLaw.net, 2016). The figure for safeguards is not significantly different from the total 
figure. For comparison, if you look at the SPS agreement, there have been nine dispute settlement 
rulings on particular SPS measures, all of which have been found in violation (WorldTradeLaw.net, 
2016).
5
 Yet you do not often hear that the SPS agreement is not functioning properly. At the WTO, 
governments tend to only bring challenges that they are very likely to win. Thus, it should be no 
surprise that the safeguards measures which Members decided to challenge have been found in 
violation. 
In addition, if you move slightly beyond the Safeguards Agreement, there is a WTO case involving 
a safeguard measure imposed on Chinese tires under the special procedures of China's Accession 
Protocol, in which the WTO found no violation (Charnovitz and Hoekman, 2013). Thus, it is possible 
to impose a safeguard measure consistently with WTO rules. 
On the other hand, critics of WTO dispute settlement review of safeguard measures feel that the 
standard being set is an impossible one to meet, as it appears determined to find some fault in every 
case. It is unclear what is required of the domestic government agencies, the critics argue, and there 
are often some requirements developed by panels and the Appellate Body and imposed on 
investigating authorities that lead to violations which could not have been anticipated. Strict is fine, 
these folks say, but the review actually being conducted goes too far. 
In the face of this controversy, it is worth considering the options going forward for how best to 
deal with safeguard measures in international trade law and litigation. If we were to do something 
about safeguards at the WTO, what could be done? One approach would be to consider each of the 
main Safeguards Agreement obligations in the context of a broad review of the agreement by all WTO 
members, taking into account the jurisprudence so far. How should the causation analysis work? What 
kind of link should there be between increased imports and injury? Do we really need an unforeseen 
developments requirement? However, any ambitious review plan of this sort might be unrealistic 
given the realities of WTO negotiations these days. As part of the Doha round, WTO members have 
been reviewing anti-dumping and countervailing duties, but have not come close to reaching 
agreement. It is not clear why safeguards would fare any better. 
Perhaps a simpler and more feasible approach would be to adjust the standard of review applied by 
panels. That standard was expressed this way by the Passenger Cars panel: 
7.27. …. In case there is no reasoned and adequate explanation in the published report to support 
the competent authorities' determinations, "the panel has no option but to find that the competent 
authority has not performed the analysis correctly". This notably implies that reasoning, analysis 
and demonstrations provided after publication of the report – i.e. ex post explanations – are 
irrelevant and cannot be relied upon to remedy any deficiencies of the competent authorities' 
determinations. 
The standard of review is a judicial creation, so it does not require an amendment to the Safeguards 
Agreement to change it (although the change could be carried out this way). All it would take is a 
recognition by panels and the Appellate Body that a new approach is needed. There are two options in 
this regard. First, the standard of review itself could be changed, perhaps along the lines of some of the 
AD Agreement standards that, on their face at least, could be taken to offer more deference to 
domestic authorities. Second, the standard of review language noted above could be applied more 
flexibly, giving investigating authorities more leeway. For example, in the Passengers Cars case, the 
Panel could have found that the end point to end point analysis carried out by the investigating 
authority was good enough. "Reasoned and adequate" has a lot of flexibility embedded it. Panels 
looking to be more deferential to domestic authorities could use this flexibility to find that imperfect 
reasoning by domestic authorities is good enough to meet the Safeguards Agreement obligations. 
                                                     
5
 The Hormones Suspension cases are not included in this category, even though issues of SPS consistency were part of the 
dispute, as the primary claims focused on the legality of the U.S. and Canadian suspension measures. 
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Finally, to take a more radical route, consider the nature of the exercise of applying safeguards. A 
domestic government agency conducts an examination of whether imports are harming a domestic 
industry. While foreign interests are represented in the preceding, and there is the possibility of 
domestic judicial review, there is nonetheless a concern that the examination will not be carried out 
fairly. To deal with this worry, there is a separate international review process at the WTO. However, 
the review is not a de novo one, but rather one that scrutinizes the domestic agencies' reasoning. 
This process takes a great deal of time. In this case, domestic authorities initiated the investigation 
on June 30, 2011 with the measure imposed in April of 2013. At the WTO, the consultations request 
was filed on 30 October 2013, with DSB adoption taking place on 20 July 2015. Thus, the process 
takes a long time (here, four years in total), and leads to results which seem to leave many people 
unhappy. Perhaps there is a better way. 
If the goal is to ensure a neutral determination of whether a safeguard measure is justified, we 
could consider setting up a special international tribunal to make the initial decision on imposition of 
the measure. Thus, instead of the domestic industry petitioning a domestic government agency with its 
claims of injury, it would go straight to the WTO. In this scenario, the WTO tribunal would not be 
reviewing the government decision, but rather conducting a de novo review of whether increased 
imports, serious injury and causation occurred. 
There are several benefits of this approach. First, it would save the time and expense of the WTO 
challenge. Having built-in international review at the initial stage, the long WTO litigation process 
could be avoided. 
Second, it removes the worry of nationalistic bias. Rather than use international oversight of 
domestic government action, it simply eliminates that government action entirely, and thus the 
potential for bias is gone. 
Third, it reconceives the WTO's role in relation to domestic protectionism. Instead of the WTO 
always being the international organization that thwarts domestic protectionism, to the dismay of 
many industry and labor groups, the WTO could now authorize some protectionism. Obviously, from 
a policy perspective, this result is a negative. We would be better off with less protectionism, not more. 
But politically, we know there will always be some protectionism, and this might be a better approach 
to managing it.  
Fourth, the added efficiency of one tribunal to handle these cases, rather than dozens of national 
agencies, would be enormous.  
6. Conclusions 
After a surge of WTO dispute settlement reports on safeguards measures from 1999 - 2003, the 
numbers of have dwindled considerably. There was one in 2012, and now the Ukraine - Passenger 
Cars case in 2015. There is one more case in the pipeline. 
The limited number of cases probably means any issues related to safeguards adjudication at the 
WTO will not get much attention anytime soon. The initial surge of safeguards disputes brought lots 
of attention; the subsequent decline in these cases led to that attention being shifted elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, each new panel finding offers an opportunity to reassess both the economics of 
safeguards and their international judicial review at the WTO. This paper has tried to offer economic 
insights about this particular case, and broader suggestions about the role of the WTO in these matters. 
This case also highlights the problems that developing countries face in the application of WTO 
rules. Ukraine's handling of the safeguard investigation in this case appears to have been driven more 
by domestic political considerations than the discipline required by the rules-based WTO process. To a 
large extent, this is driven by the lack of understanding of the complexities of such investigations. 
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Both the domestic industry association and government representatives were stating that the goal was 
to attract car manufacturers to assemble cars in Ukraine, in one of the largest markets in Europe, a 
significant growth potential. The domestic industry and policy-makers were facing a drastic drop in 
sales, and withdrawal of investment after a relatively long period of stable growth. However, the 
domestic parties were not fully aware of the available tools, as well as costs and benefits of these tools. 
Earlier safeguard disputes have already shown that developing countries might not fully internalize the 
complexities and consequences of the obligations they undertake, e.g. Bown and Wu (2014) analyze 
the case of Dominican Republic's safeguard measure. Thus our findings suggest a need for more 
capacity-building to help developing countries better use of WTO-sanctioned investment and trade 
policy tools. 
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